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A global analysis of imperfect competition in the banking systems and the latest Israeli 
regulation dealing with market failures. 
Abstract: The high concentration of the banking sector is a cross-border phenomenon that has 
high impact on local and global economies. This paper's main goal is to analyze the factors that 
impact concentration in the banking systems around the globe. The innovation of this paper is that 
we combined economic, "economic enviromnent", and culture variables as explanatory variables 
for this analysis . .We found among other things that regulation in the banking system is helpful in 
order to keep it competitive. We also found that when the society has more individual values 
rather than collective ones, its banking sector is less concentrated. In the second part of the paper 
we focused on the Israeli case, showing that although recent indicators of the Israeli banking 
system indicate a higher level of concentration and lower level of competition, it seems that the 
recent trend is moving toward less concentration and higher competition. 
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1 Introduction 
Banking systems around the world are characterized by a high level of concentration. This could 
affect the economic growth and welfare of a nation due to fact that the banking system plays a 
fundamental role in the economy as the main fmanciaJ intermediary between savers and investors. 
A higher concentration of the banking systems could lead to reduced competition levels and thus 
to higher intermediation costs, which can cut the number of sources available for investment. This 
has a wide range of negative impacts, such as lower economic growth and loss of social welfare. 
In the past few decades it seems that the level of concentration in the banking systems 
around the world has increased. For example, between 1980 and 1997 the total number of banks 
in the United States fell from 36,000 institutions to 20,000, and by the end of 2002 the figure had 
dipped to ouly 9,300 (Zaretsky, 2004). In Europe the number of institutions fell from 9,500 to 
7,000 during this same period. It seems that this trend is a worldwide phenomenon. The 
concentration of the banking system is even higher in developing countries than in the developed 
countries raising the fear that the trend of reducing the inequality in world welfare could be 
halted .. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review 
and the main goal of the paper. In Section 3 we describe the data and methodology used in this 
research. The fourth section reports the empirical results. Section 5 reviews the Israeli case, 
dealing with the high concentration of its banking sector. Finally, the sixth section concludes the 
paper and discusses the implications of our finding. 
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2 Literature review 
According to Jansen and Haan (2003), the following trends can be observed in the banking sector: 
an increase in the scope of mergers and acquisitions; a national focus in consolidation activities; a 
declining number of banks; and an increasing degree of concentration in most European 
countries. Actually, in the 1990s banks in Europe greatly intensified their merger and acquisition 
activities (see Berger et al., 1999). Banks mobilize, allocate, and invest much of society's savings, 
so bank performance has substantive repercussions on capital allocation, firm growth, industrial 
expansion, and economic development. Thus the consolidation of banks around the globe in 
recent years has intensified public policy debates on the influences of concentration and 
competition in the banking industry. 
It is generally agreed that market concentration is one of the most important determinants 
of competitiveness (Nathan and Neave, 1989). The relationship between market concentration and 
competitiveness in the banking sector has been examined in detail for many countries, and the 
results indicated that high concentration tends to reduce competitiveness in this sector (Bikker and 
Groeneveld, 2000). However, Jansen and Haan (2003) found that concentration and competition 
are not related. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) found that higher bank concentration is 
associated with greater fmancing obstacles, especially for smaller firms, and thus could harm the 
level of activity of those firms. Actually, in countries in which the banking system is more 
concentrated the average firm size is relatively larger (Cetorelli, 2001, 2003). In markets with 
concentrated banking, new firms face greater difficulty gaining access to credit compared to 
markets in which banking is more competitive (Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006). 
Deidda and Fattouh (2005) found that banking concentration is negatively associated with 
per-capita income growth and industrial growth only in low-income countries. This suggests that 
reducing concentration is more likely to promote growth in developing countries than in 
developed ones. Xiaoqiang and Degryse (2006) investigated the Chinese provinces over the 
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period 1995-2003, and found that there is a higher positive significant impact on local economic 
growth in provinces where the banking system is less concentrated. 
A higher level of concentration could create a monopolistic market power of banks, which 
would raise the opportunity costs of capital, and thus would tend to make fmancing more 
expensive (Smith, 1998). Lack of adequate competition in banking could thus adversely affect 
economic development. There is a positive significant connection between concentration and 
profitability (Molyneux and Forbes, 1995) The reasoning for this is as follows: In markets with a 
high degree of concentration firms have more market power, which allows them to set prices 
above marginal costs and achieve higher profits (Goldberg and Rai, 1996). 
Garrnaise and Moslowitz (2006) showed that neighborhoods that experience more bank 
mergers are subject to higher interest rates, diminished local construction, lower prices, an influx 
of poorer households, and higher property crime in subsequent years. Beck et. al. (2004) found 
negative effects of bank market power on access to credit, especially for developing countries, 
and especially for small-size firms. According to the results ofMaudos and Nagore (2005), in 
developing countries the concentration of the banking industry is much higher then in the 
developed countries. This means that all of the economic problems presented in the literature 
above will have a greater impact in developing countries. 
Measures of concentration and competition in the banking industry and characteristics that 
cause higher levels of concentration, and their implication upon economic welfare, are very 
important for the policy makers. Understanding the causes of high level of concentration and its 
implication upon economic and social performance could help in initiating the appropriate policy. 
The main goal of the paper is to try to assess which factors can be attributed to a higher 
level of concentration in the banking industry. We will analyze economic differences, together 
with culture differences in order to explain the variations in concentration levels between the 
countries. 
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In addition, we will analyze how a public policy that aims to achieve a structural change in 
the banking system affects the concentration level in the Israeli banking system. 
3 Method 
3.1 Sample 
Our sample includes 42 countries out of the 58 countries for whom had concentration 
factors for their banking industry. There were two categories of countries were not included in the 
empirical analysis, the frrst includes countries that didn't have culture characteristics as delineated 
by Hofstede (1980, 1983), and the second includes three countries that had a very high and 
unusual concentration in their banking system, as can be seen in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 Concentration index by countries 
10.0 20.0 60.0 70.0 
5.0 15.0 25.0 35.0 45.0 55.0 65.0 
Countries 
Each of the three countries on the right side of the figure that had an unusual concentration 
are developing countries: Panama, Botswana and Zambia. Table 1 presents the countries in the 
sample. 
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Table 1: Country list 
Country HHI CR(3). 
Argentina 653 24.98 
Australia 980 26.13 
Austria 769 21.36 
Bangladesh 1,273 36.47 
Belgium 165 25.16 
Brazil 956 3.84 
Canada 1,149 34.13 
Chile 1,541 41.69 
China 1,511 46.40 
Czech Republic 1,312 34.87 
Denmark 118 28.62 
Finland 2,590 39.62 
France 396 15.53 
Germany 188 8.91 
Ghana 2,941 44.97 
Greece 1551 46.82 
Guatemala 984 25.17 
Hungary 2,461 43.35 
India 629 22.60 
Indonesia 1,689 24.79 
Ireland 858 35.94 
Israel 1,689 48.81 
Italy 322 13.80 
Jamaica 2,367 56.82 
Japan 285 12.68 
Kuwait 1 '193 32.73 
Malaysia 616 22.45 
Mexico 924 34.27 
Netherlands 1,246 39.19 
New Zealand 1,490 54.60 
Peru 1,696 46.80 
Poland 1,436 35.12 
Portugal 722 27.50 
Romania 3,718 56.28 
South Africa 1,170 31.51 
Spain 468 16.61 
Sweden 959 31.68 
Switzerland 1,520 32.10 
Thailand 784 24.29 
United Kingdom 362 17.98 
United States 130 5.59 
As can be seen from the Table we have a diverse sample, with countries from all around 
the globe exhibiting a wide range of wealth. 
7 
3.2 The Variables 
We used two variables to measure the concentration of the banking industry in the sample. The 
values of the two variables for each country are displayed in Table 1. The first variable is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) for the banking system. The HH1 index for concentration was 
chosen mainly because of its simple structure. The HHI is the most widely used measure of 
concentration in the theoretical literature, and often serves as a benchmark for the evaluation of 
other concentration indices (Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Zaretsky, 2004) 
HH1 is calculated by squaring each bank's share of assets in a market and then adding 
these squared shares. 
" 
HHI = L:s;2 , 
H 
where n represents the number of banks and s; represents the share of the bank i in the market. 
We assume that the flow of banking goods and services produced by a bank is proportional to its 
total assets. So market shares in that case equal the bank's assets divided by total bank assets in 
the economy. 
The index number can range from zero (a perfectly competitive market) to 10,000 (a pure 
monopoly). For example, the perfectly competitive market would consist of many firms, each 
with about the same market share. As the number of firms in this market increases, each firm's 
share decreases, nntil it approaches the limit of zero. The square of zero is zero, so the sum of 
those squares is still zero. The pure monopoly market would have only one fmn that controls 100 
percent of the market. The square of 100 is 10,000. 
According to the anti-trust guidelines in the United States, a market can be broadly 
characterized as unconcentrated if the HHI is less than I ,000 points, as moderately concentrated if 
the HHI is between 1,000 and 1,800, and as highly concentrated if the HH1 is above 1,800. These 
thresholds apply not only to banking but to all industries in the United States. In the United States, 
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the HHl plays a significant role in the enforcement process of antitrust laws in banking. An 
application for the merger of two banks will be approved without further investigation if the basic 
guidelines for the evaluation of the concentration in the markets are satisfied. Those guidelmes 
specifY that the post-merger market HHI does not exceed 1,800 and that the increase of the index 
from the pre-merger situation is less than 200 (Cetorelli, 1999). 
The second variable we used to measure concentration is the CR(3)- market share of the 
three largest banks in the country. We used this additional variable that measures concentration in 
order to check the robustness of the results. The HHI and CR(3) data were taken from Maudos 
and Nagore (2005). The independent variables are of three types- culture variables, socio-
economic variables, and those variables reflecting the "economic environment". 
The culture variables 
Cultural differences affect the way people think and react A major research study on 
national cultural differences published by Hofstede (1980; 1983) is based on research conducted 
on IBM personnel from 50 countries, using 116,000 questionnaires. The questions regarding 
employee values demonstrated the differences among countries in four cultural dimensions: 
Power Distance, Individualism, Masculinity and Uncertainty Avoidance. Hofstede's culture 
dimensions are still key players in culture evaluations and empirical tests (Crotts and Erdmann, 
2000; Downey et al., 2005; Dwyer et al., 2005). The four dimensions produced two variables 
representing the country's culture in regards to tolerance of concentration in the banking sector. 
Power Distance Index (PDI) focuses on the degree of equality, or inequality, among 
people in the country's society. A high Power Distance ranking indicates that inequalities of 
power and wealth have been allowed to grow within the society. These societies are more likely 
to follow a caste system that does not allow significant upward mobility of all its citizens. A low 
Power Distance ranking indicates the society de-emphasizes the differences between its citizens' 
power and wealth. In these societies equality and opportunity for everyone is stressed. 
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Individualism (ID V) - focuses on the degree the society reinforces individual or 
collective achievement and interpersonal relationships. A low Individualism ranking typifies 
societies of a more collectivist nature. These cultures reinforce extended families and collectives 
where everyone takes responsibility for fellow members of their group. 
Hofstede measures continue to enjoy strong support among researchers (e.g., Sivakumar 
and Nakata, 2001), and serve as a de facto set of benchmark measures. 
The socio-economic and "economic environment" variables 
Gini index (distribution offamily income) -The Gini Index is a calculation of income 
distribution within a country. 0.00 equals perfectly equitable income distribution in the 
population, while 100.00 equals perfectly inequitable income. The Gini index is one of the most 
popular indices to measure inequality (Allison, 1978; Morduch and Sicular; 2002). The data were 
collected from the CIA World Fact Book. 
FDI (foreign direct investment)- the share of foreign direct investment from the GDP. 
This index could be an indicator for the level of integration of the economy of a country with the 
economy of the world. We preferred this index because it is more likely to affect the capital 
markets. 
Economic freedom index- Economic freedom is defined as the absence of government 
coercion or constraint on the production, distribution, or consumption of goods and services 
beyond the extent necessary for citizens to protect and maintain liberty itself. In other words, 
people are free to work, produce, consume, and invest in ways they feel are most productive. 
Economic freedom categories: 
Score 
1-1.99 
2-2.99 
3-3.99 
4-5 
Free 
Mostly free 
Mostly unfree 
Repressed 
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These data were collected from "The Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal Index of Economic 
Freedom". 
_Time required to start a business- the average time in days to start a business. This 
index could indicate the atroosphere and the level of bureaucracy that the business works with. 
Time required to enforce a contract- average in days to enforce a contract. This index 
could imply, for example to the costs of maintaining a law departroent that should be part of the 
business. 
4. Results 
At the first stage we conducted a Kolmogorov-Smimov goodness-of-fit test on the two 
dependent variables. The results showed that the HHI sample does not distribute normally and 
because the sample was a small one (n=42); we used a logit regression to test the HHI variable. 
We used a dichotomy variable as the independent variable where all of the countries with HHI 
higher than the average HHI were considered as a country with a concentrated market in the 
banking systems, and thus got a I in the HHI index. All of the other countries were considered as 
countries with no concentration in the banking system and thus got 0 in the HHI index. The result 
of the regression is displayed in Table 2. 
a e : OgJt Tbi2L "HHI 
Variable Coefficients 
c 9.82 
GIN! -.278* 
PDI -.145* 
IDV -.127* 
Economic freedom 2.63+ 
FDI .64* 
Time required to start a business .04+, 
Time required to enforce a contract .003 
* P-VALUE<0.05 +P-VALUE<O.I P-VALUE 
REGRESSION= 0.000 Negelkerke R2 =0.69 Overall 
Classification Percentage=90.2 
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The CR(3) dependent variable was normally distributed according to the Kolmogorov-
Smimov goodness-of-fit test, so we used a OLS regression. The GINI variable was left out 
because it was not significant and it reduced the Adjusted R2 of the regression. The results of the 
CR(3) regression are displayed in Table 3. 
Table 3: OLS CR(3) 
Variable Coefficients 
c 41.8** 
PDI -.363** 
IDV -.27* 
Economic freedom 10.16* 
FDI 1.38* 
Time required to start a business .0.003 
Time required to enforce a contract .02 
** P-VALUE<O.OI * P-VALUE<0.05 P-VALUE 
REGRESSION= 0.021 Adjusted R2 =0.332 
As can be seen from Table 2, when the inequality in income distribution as reflected in the 
GINI index is greater, the concentration in the banking industry as reflected in the HID index is 
higher. The motivation for this result is as follows: The higher the GIN! index, the higher the 
share of few people in the total income; that could lead to a greater number of banks, due to the 
necessity of scattering risks by the banks. Let's assume that there is total inequality, i.e., one 
person gets all of the income and the rest gets zero income. In this situation one bank is not 
enough, due to high risk exposure. Therefore, more banks should operate in order to scatter the 
risks in the banking activity. A counter-example is when the distribution of income is totally 
equal. In that case even one bank could operate, due to the fact that the risk is scattered among 
many customers. 
From both regressions (although just in the first it is significant) we can see that as the 
time required to start a business is longer (in days), the HHI is higher. Actually, the longer time 
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required to start a business indicates that the business bureaucracy is higher, and that could be an 
entrance barrier to the economic activity, and to the banking market in particular. This could lead 
to a situation where only few banks operate, thus leading to a higher concentration in the system. 
Also, as the time required to enforce a contract is longer the banking system is more concentrated. 
This is due to the fact that small banks could be prevented from entering the systems, due to the 
relatively high costs of enforcement, which requires an expensive justice department and lawyers. 
This creates an economic of scale advantage for the bigger banks. 
The regression results show that when markets are more globalized as measured by the 
share ofFDI out of the GDP, the concentration level increases. This could stem from economics 
of scale, which means that only the bigger banks could survive and merge with the international 
banks. Ernst (1997) found that globalization may well increase concentration and market power. 
It has been argued that this perplexing result is likely to occur in any industry which is 
characterized by significant scale economies and sunken costs. In addition Heasman (1997) found 
that globalization is characterized by concentration at regional, national and international levels. 
As can bee seen in both regressions the IDV coefficient is negative, which means that as 
the society has more individual values rather than collective values, its banking sector is less 
concentrated. Hofstede (1983) found that there is a positive correlation between the IDV factor 
and the wealth of the society. This is consistent with Maudos and Nagore's (2005) findings that 
developing countries have an higher HHI than developed countries. 
As for the PDI, we found an interesting result that as the power distance of a society 
culture is higher, the expected concentration of its banking system is lower. This result requires 
deeper research in the culture field, although we think that it can be explained as follows: As the 
society is characterized by more castes, a more diversified banking system is required (i.e., each 
caste has different requirements from the banking services). This leads to diversified demands 
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that can only be fulfilled by a greater number of banks, resulting in less concentration in the 
banking system. 
When economic freedom is high the HHI and the CR(3) are higher as well. Economic 
freedom means less regulation. Less regulation allows for mergers of banks, and that leads to a 
higher HHI index. Less regulation suggests a weaker antitrust policy, which means that it easier to 
cartelize the branch or even monopolise it by mergers and acquisitions. A good example of this 
phenomena is the United States banking industry. Most states either prohibited branching 
altogether or limited it until the 1970s. Between 1970 and 1994, however, 38 states deregu1ated 
their restrictions on branching. In addition to facing restrictions on within-state branching, the 
Douglas Amendment to the 1956 Bank Holding Company (BHC) Act prohibited a BHC from 
acquiring banks outside the state where it was headquartered. States had the option of allowing 
out-of-state BHCs to enter, but none exercised this until 1978, when Maine permitted such 
transactions. As part of the Gam-St Germain Act, federal legislators in 1982 amended the BHC 
Act to allow failed banks and thrifts to be acquired by any bank holding company, regardless of 
state laws (Kroszner and Strahan, 1999). Many states then entered regional or national reciprocal 
arrangements, whereby their banks could be bought by any other state in the arrangement. Several 
recent developments have contributed to the removal of geographic barriers limiting bank 
expansion. In the mid-1980s, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency took advantage of a 
clause in the 1864 National Bank Act to allow nationally chartered banks to branch freely in those 
states where savings institutions did not face branching restrictions. The Comptroller's action was 
instrumental in introducing state wide branching in several southern states. Another impetus 
behind deregulation was the rash of bank and thrift failures in the 1980s (Kane 1996). Since 1994 
a series of bills before Congress have proposed consolidating all bank supervisory responsibilities 
under a new single federal regulator, separate from the Federal Reserve. Proponents of such 
legislation have argued that bank supervision only distracts the Federal Reserve from its central 
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task of conducting monetary policy (Peek et.all, 1999). As a result of this deregulation and 
freedom the number of banks in the United States has decreased dramatically in the last two 
decades, as was discussed in Section 2 of this paper. 
What are the economic impacts of a higher concentrated banking system? We examined 
the correlations between the HHI index and the interest rate spread, which means the average gap 
between the lending interest rate and the deposit interest rate. We found a positive correlation 
between the HHI and the interest rate spread. This result was expected, due to the fact that a 
higher HHI index could imply that the banking system is less competitive, and thus allows the 
banks to take a higher "mediation" fee and increase their profits. 
The impact of a higher interest spread could be destructive to economic activity. For 
example. a higher interest rate to the lenders could be an entrance barrier for small business from 
all branches of economic activity, and thus could harm growth. Another example is from the 
deposits side, as when the interest rate on deposits is smaller it reduces the willingness to save, 
and thus reduces the capital supply available for investments. 
Another correlation that we consider to be important is between the HHI and the number 
of branches per 1,000 people. We found a significant negative correlation which means that the 
higher the HHI the lower the number of branches per 1,000 people. This could imply that the total 
welfare that the banking system creates is smaller; for example, higher travel costs to the local 
branch or longer queues. 
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5 Analyzing the case of Israel 
The Ismel regulator understood that higher freedom in the banking industry leads to a higher 
concentration, resulting in monopolistic prices and high interest rote. Therefore, the regulator 
created a new reform in the Israeli banking system. 
In April2004, the Finance Minister appointed the Bachar Committee, named after its 
chairman. The Committee recommended a few actions required for establishing an efficient and 
competitive capital market in Israel. In Israel, both the commercial banking and the fmancial 
intermediation are completely dominated by the banks, as Table 4 shows. 
Table 4: Israeli banking market {2004) 
Banking Mutual funds Provident funds Underwriting 
Deposits Assets managed Assets managed Number ofissues 
Poalim-30% Poalim-36% Poalim-41% Poalim-27% 
Leumi-30% Leumi-31% Leumi-19% Leumi-24% 
IDB-18% IDB-13% IDB-13% Clal-14% 
78% 80% 73% 65% 
In addition to the banks' domination of the capital market, the commercial banking 
industry itself is also highly concentrated and virtually controlled by two banking groups, Poalim 
andLeumi. 
The Bachar Committee's main recommendation that became a law was that banks and 
controlling shareholders of a bank are not permitted to hold any interest at all in a company that 
manages a provident or mutual fund, nor are they be permitted to hold more than a 5% interest in 
any firm or institution that holds more than a 5% interest in a company that manages such funds. 
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The governor of the Bank of Israel, Stanley Fischer, stated in 20051, "With regard to the 
Bachar Committee, the high degree of concentration in the capital market has an adverse effect on 
economic growth and efficiency. It is very difficult to pursue a policy of economic reforms 
without dealing with this issue in a thorough and comprehensive manner. The proposals of the 
Bachar Committee offer a good solution to the problems of concentration afflicting Israel's capital 
market. Most of the credit market is in the hands of the banks, and although non bank credit has 
been expanding recently, the rate at which this is happening still leaves the bulk of credit within 
the banking system." 
Rotenberg (2005) showed that the Israeli banking system is relatively highly concentrated 
in comparison to other countries. This is consistent with Bikker et al. (2006), who found that the 
level of competition in the banking system in Israel is four time less than the average level of 
competition in the world. 
New will now analyze the trends in the banking system in Israel in recent years. In 
general, the trend of the concentration in assets as measured by the HHI in Israel is toward 
decreasing the level of concentration. This can be seen in Figure 2. 
We found a positive and significant correlation of0.447 (p<O.OI) between the HHI in 
Israel and the interest gap (as we found in the cross country comparison). This relation suggests 
that a higher level of concentration allows the banks to operate in a less competitive market, and 
thus leads them to increase their "mediation fee", which is reflected, among other things, in the 
interest spread. 
In recent years, as the concentration in the banking system decreased, the interest spread 
decreased as well. Actually, from 1999 the HHI index decreased by about 3% while the interest 
spread decreased by about I% (this reflects a decrease of about 38% in the interest spread). 
1See: The Governor, Stanley Fischer- Address. by the Governor of the Bank oflsrael, Professor Stan!ey 
Fischer, today to the Knesset Finance Committee 30.5.2005 
http://www .bankisrael.gov .ill deptdata/neumim/neum 180e.htm 
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Figure 2: The trend of the HHI in assets in Israel since 1998 
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As can be seen in Figure 2, the decrease of the HHI during these years wasn't smooth. In 
2001-2003 the HHI increased, however since 2003 it has decreased again. The decrease in the 
concentration index since 2003 could be explained by the trends of selling pension funds and 
other long-term deposits funds by the banks to other companies that aren't from the banking 
system In preparation for the Bachar Committee's reform, we should bear in mind that the banks 
with the highest market share had the largest pension funds and other investment funds. One more 
possible reason for the decrease in the HHI since 2003 is the rapid increase of the bonds share of 
total business sector financing, from 20% to 39%. This trend could decrease the market share of 
the bigger banks, due to the fact that big and medium debtors could raise part of their credit in the 
bonds market rather than from the banks. According to Rotenberg (2005), The bigger banks 
have a higher market share of the big debtors in the economy. 
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Figure 3: Bonds share of total business sector fmancing 
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The rapid increase in the bonds share of total business sector fmancing probably had a 
significant impact on the interest gap in the market, due to the fact that the bond market is a 
substitute for the credit and deposit activity in the banks. 
When the substitute is more effective and takes place as a profound player in the market, 
the bargaining power of the bigger customers ofthe banks is higher, and that could lead to a 
decrease in the interest gap in the market. 
Figure 4: The interest gap trends in Israel 
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However, the recent indicators of the Israeli banking system show a higher level of 
concentration and lower level of competition. It seems that the recent trend is towards less 
concentration and higher competition. 
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6 Conclusions and implications 
In this paper we analyzed the factors that impact concentration in the banking systems around the 
world. We used the Herfrndahl-Hirschman Index_ as a concentration index, together with the 
CR(3) index. We found evidence that as the economic freedom in the country is higher, the 
concentration in the banking system is also higher. We concluded that regulation in the system is 
necessary in order to keep in competitive (e.g., credit history as a market failure in the banking 
system). 
An additional interesting result is that if the society has more individual values rather than 
collective values, its banking sector is less concentrated. Hofstede (1983) found that there is a 
positive correlation between the IDV factor and the wealth of the society. This is consistent with 
Maudos and Nagore's (2005) results that developing countries have a higher HHI than developed 
countries. 
After we explained the factors that affect the level of concentration, we looked into the 
impact of the concentration on the actual economic activity. We found that asthe banking system 
is more concentrated, the interest gap is higher and the number of branches per 1000 people is 
smaller. This led us to the conclusion that higher concentration could harm the economic activity 
and welfare of consumers. 
Our conclusion is that the regulatory system should interfere in the free banking sector in 
order to obtain a more competitive market that will lead to lower interest rate gaps and higher 
growth. This is especially true in developing countries, because they suffer from higher 
concentration than the developed countries. The paper brings into focus how a regulatory act in 
Israel helped to minimize the concentration in the capital and banking sectors. 
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